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The Symposium brought together a strong mixture of academic and
practitioner participants. I am of the latter category, having been a mediator
and arbitrator in a broad variety of disputes for nearly fifty years. My invited
contribution to the Symposium was a report on a mediation project,
conducted with my colleague Susan Podziba under the leadership of Moritz
College of Law Professors Edward Foley and Nancy Rogers, which
examined the possibility of enhancing the redistricting process in Ohio and
Illinois through mediated discussions. I also participated in the general
discussion of Professor Joshua Douglas' presentation and have been invited
to comment on his article.'
The comment that I made at the Symposium, and will repeat here with
some greater explanation, may seem ironic. A long-term advocate of "public
policy mediation" is an unlikely proponent of restraint in extolling the
capacities of that strategy. However, my experience as a practitioner includes
many "successful" mediations in which the interactions were hostile and rude
throughout. It is true that parties to mediation are often seeking more civil
and productive relations and that their relationships are substantially
enhanced as an effect of the process. But not all parties to mediated
negotiations seek, or achieve, that effect. Mediation often demonstrates the
benefits of interest-based, non-adversarial approaches, but not always, if my
experience is a sample.
Negotiations, even when mediated, are anxiety-provoking. The stakes are
high. The individuals participating are navigating among clients, allies, and
adversaries. It is not surprising when "emotions" are in play. The atmosphere
can be charged and the serene oasis that may be imagined is not the scene at
hand. Members of my age cohort who are musing about becoming mediators
after they retire often approach me. I know they contemplate a place of calm
and reason where their accumulated skills and wisdom will be gratefully
received and they will rescue others from conflict and chaos.
Skillful negotiators do not lose sight of their ultimate objectives or lose
touch with their values. Mediators may find it necessary to be aggressive and
even a bit brutal in their role as "agents of reality." The atmosphere at the
bargaining table and in the caucuses can be tense and unfriendly when
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mediators are doing their job. A mutually beneficial agreement may result-
but not an enhanced relationship.
I would not offer mediation as a reliable antidote for pervasive incivility
in American politics, especially if doing so implies that parties who enter that
process may be overcome by its powers despite their own intentions and
contrary behavior. In my judgment, mediation's potential for salutary after-
effects, like most of mediation's potential, correlates with the parties' desire
to realize such benefits.
Ongoing relationships of the utmost importance to the parties are the
most hospitable medium for mediation's "transformational" effects. Thus,
mediators in commercial contract litigation may emphasize the wisdom of
nurturing post-dispute business to gain greater motivation to settle. Still,
some former spouses remain hostile following mediation of their continuing
parenting arrangements. Likewise, unions and employers, despite their
obvious interdependence, are not inevitably more collaborative after
mediated collective bargaining. I would suggest that election-related
litigation, linked as it is to winning or losing entirely, may be particularly
resistant to the reorienting of the parties by mediation.
I agree with Professor Douglas that negotiations over slightly removed
matters of process, including dispute resolution processes, may be a more
promising medium for mitigating combativeness. Negotiators are unlikely to
put aside their desire for ultimate advantage even when the topic is process,
but there are times when a fair and intelligent process is a mutually
acceptable outcome as compared to alternatives. I also agree that what may
appear to be an agreement on a minor matter may also provide a lesson to the
parties regarding the benefits of collaboration.
Moreover, and now I would change my tone from cautionary to
reinforcing, I appreciate Professor Douglas' suggestion that negotiated
rulemaking seems particularly promising. "Negotiated rulemaking," like
"mediation," has proved to be a flexible term that seems to accommodate a
variety of processes. What is important to note is that negotiated rulemaking
is distinct from the litigation-settlement mediation with which most observers
are familiar. It is transactional, legislative, norm creation-not norm
enforcing or grounded on predicting litigation outcomes. It requires different
mediation tasks, methods, and responsibilities. It is feasible in many cases,
but it is not the mediation to which many mediators and advocates are
accustomed.
The negotiated rulemaking process to which I refer does not identify the
participants as do other mediations. There are no plaintiffs or defendants, no
company and union, no husband and wife. When done properly, the process
begins with a feasibility assessment that suggests who should participate,
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among many other important factors, and where appropriate, a process
design. It is very sensitive to the particular political culture in which it is to
occur. It reflects realism and sophistication with respect to the time and
place. It respects important idiosyncrasies and discounts templates. Should
the participants include candidates, party officials, other political
influentials, 2 and advocacy organizations?
Often, it is necessary to negotiate ground rules before proceeding to
substantive negotiations. Negotiated rulemaking mediators should conduct
the assessment and facilitate the negotiations. But assisting the negotiators in
this creative process does not draw on the mediators' substantive expertise so
much as their ability to interest, organize, and then elicit invention from the
parties. These mediators have responsibilities as catalysts and organizers that
are generally not placed on mediators in other types of cases.
Negotiated rulemaking is not always carried out ideally, but in my
experience, its ad hoc improvisational nature provides a medium for
creativity; and inasmuch as that creativity is a joint enterprise of the
negotiators, their interactions thereafter are positively affected. That is not to
say that the participants leave behind their diverse and conflicted
perspectives, but that they do not forget that they have the capacity to
collaborate and that they value that capacity. I would suggest that negotiated
rulemaking in particular warrants further consideration and experimentation
as a moderating influence on our current political style.
Although the foregoing is mainly focused on mediation as a means of
avoiding or settling election-related litigation, Professor Douglas' concerns
also include the contribution that courts and judicial decision writing have
made to the belligerent tone of political conflict. He observes that over-
heated rhetoric in decisions, particularly as reported in the media, adds yet
another negative factor to the political climate.
These days, candidates for judicial positions themselves engage in
election campaigns that are advised, managed, and funded by the same
organizations and individuals that support non-judicial campaigns. Even
where such candidates are officially nonpartisan they are often broadly
associated with a political party. The very tactics that concern us in general
are increasingly present in races for judgeships.
It is little wonder that the style of expression that pervades in election
campaigns persists when the candidate is in office. I am less certain that
campaign tacticians draw upon the negative expressions to be found in
2 "Other political influentials" refer to entities that are persuasive among frontline
actors but do not fit within the other listed categories. Examples might include certain
local government and business organizations.
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judicial decisions; but if ADR might provide some mitigation of the
pervasiveness of that tone, it should be promoted as an alternative.
It is a concern when advocates of mediation seem to undervalue the
frustrating orthodoxies that conceive of mediation as an alternative, and that
require that participation in mediation be voluntary. I would acknowledge
that in many instances in election disputes, litigation is the wiser course. It
provides public findings of wrongdoing, public vindication, and precedent to
govern future decisions. In my view, mediation is to be selected by those
who find it preferable in consideration of their own interests.
It seems that we must convince those who, with some substantiation,
already attribute success in political advocacy to combativeness when, in
some cases, moderately-toned "problem-solving" will be to their advantage.
As Professor Douglas suggests, we must understand the "realities" of the
contemporary political campaign and identify where mediation may be
consistent with the parties' interests. That is a particular version of the
challenge that has been confronted throughout the growth of mediation in
general. Persistence has been rewarded, albeit too slowly for some of us. It
seems reasonable to continue to be patient and optimistic.
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